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Abstract
This paper seeks to give an account of what could be involved in interpreting a
theory. The aim is to try and provide a robust conception of theory-interpretation
which operates in terms internal to the representational architecture of the theory,
rather than importing meaning by stipulative correspondence to external terms.
1 Introduction
Philosophers of science spend a lot of time “interpreting” scientic theories. In this pa-
per, I try to get a handle onwhat it is theymight be up to. Mymain contention is that a
certain picture of interpretation is widespread (though implicit) in contemporary phi-
losophy of science: a picture according towhich interpretation of theories is relevantly
analogous to the interpretation of foreign literature. On this picture, which we might
call the external account of theory-interpretation, meaning is to be imported into the
equations by putting them in correspondence with some discourse whose signs and
symbols are already endowed with signicance. Of course, the prevalence of this pic-
ture wouldn’t be much of a problem if that picture were the only way to think about
interpretation, or was clearly the best way to do so (though even then, there would be
a value to bringing it out into the light). I contend, however, that it is neither. There is
an alternative way of thinking about interpretation—what we can call the “internal”
account of interpretation—which instead takes interpretation to be a matter of delin-
eating a theory’s internal semantic architecture. At a minimum, I hope to convince
you the internal picture highlights an aspect of interpretation that we are otherwise at
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risk of neglecting. But I also aim to show that the internal picture oers a richer and
more satisfying account of interpretation than the external picture does.
The paper proceeds as follows. I start (section 2) by assembling various platitudes
about what interpretation is for, so that we can get a bead on the notion we are af-
ter. Section 3 outlines the external account of interpretation in more detail, looking
in particular at two examples of the form: the reductionist story about interpretation
found in theAufbau, and the motivating ideas behind the quest for primitive ontology
in quantum mechanics. I take a slight step back in section 4, to explore the question
of what it is we are interpreting—that is, what I am taking a “theory” (prior to inter-
pretation) to be. This lays the groundwork for the internal account of interpretation,
which I give in section 5.
2 The role of interpretation
In order to assess what interpretation is, it is well to begin by considering what inter-
pretation does. That is, we should ask what role the notion of interpretation is sup-
posed to play in our scientic and philosophical practice. Having done so, we can
then look at whether such-and-such an account of what interpretation involves does,
in fact, describe an activity that instantiates that role.
First, interpreting a theory is a necessary component of determining the theory’s
commitments, both ontological and ideological. An uninterpreted theory is just that:
a symbolic calculus, with (perhaps) rules governing how the elements of the calcu-
lus may be manipulated, but with no indication of how the calculus is of any greater
representational signicance than a game of Go. So an uninterpreted theory is not
the sort of thing which is apt to be the subject of doxastic attitudes. If it was uniquely
determinedwhat commitmentswould be involved, in the event that one takes the real-
ist plunge and decides to believe a theory, then we could perhaps claim that the mere
application of such a calculus is sucient to “count” as taking on those commitments.
But at least prima facie, there are choices over how a given formal calculus ought to
be interpreted.1 Maybe, after analysis, we will succeed in showing that there is no
such multiplicity of interpretative options—but doing so will only be possible after
the application of some philosophically rich account of interpretation, so we are still
required to develop such an account.
Second, for this reason, the notion of interpretation is crucial in explicating the
1cf. [Jones, 1991].
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realist-antirealist debate.2 To be a realist about some scientic theory is a commitment
to the (approximate) truth of the theory,3 and to be committed to the truth of those
statements under a realistic semantics for theoretical terms.4 The rst factor commits
the realist to interpretation as a process or project. If the theory’s statements are to be
asserted, and asserted as true, then the realist cannot rest content with uninterpreted
or partially interpreted theories: for uninterpreted sentences are not the sort of thing
that can be true (or false). The second factor is a constraint on what kind of interpre-
tation the realist can accept (i.e., one which gives a realistic semantics—whatever that
might mean).5
Similarly, anti-realists may characterised by their attitudes towards how best to in-
terpret theories (orwhether to interpret theories at all). The reductive empiricist is also
required to interpret theories; they merely disagree with the realist over what kind of
interpretation is appropriate. And there are good reasons for the constructive empiri-
cist to care about interpretation, since they take the provision of a realistic semantics
to be part and parcel of presenting a theory for acceptance. Only quietists are marked
out as those who think that scientic theories ought not to be interpreted at all; and
even then, they will presumably think that the observational parts of a theory require
interpretation, at least if the theory is to be tested or used. Thus, attitudes towards
the practice of interpretation (compulsory vs. supererogatory vs. ill-advised), and
towards what kinds of interpretation that practice should seek (realistic vs. deviant),
are one of the ways in which dierent positions in the debate over realism distinguish
themselves from one another.
Third, the notion of interpretation is not only a means of marking territory within
the realism debate; it also bears upon the dialectic of that debate. For consider the
virtues which, the realist contends, are such as to warrant a (truth-based) commit-
ment to a scientic theory: explanatory power, unicatory strength, etc. Put aside the
issue of whether these virtues do indeed warrant such a commitment, and instead
merely note that these are virtues of interpreted theories.6 So not only is interpretation
2cf. [Stanford, MS].
3Unlike constructive empiricists, who maintain that acceptance of a theory as empirically adequate is
sucient to licence its assertion.
4Unlike reductive empiricists—such as instrumentalists—whomay acknowledge the truth of scientic
claims, but only because such claims are understood as “secretly” being claims about observable
entities.
5cf. what Steven French (in [French, 2014, chap. 3]) calls “Chakravartty’s Challenge”: the claim that
“One cannot fully appreciate what it might mean to be a realist until one has a clear picture of what
one is being invited to be a realist about.” [Chakravartty, 2007, p. 26].
6I take this observation from [Ruetsche, 2011, Chapter 1].
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important for understanding realism, it is also a precondition of the plausibility of re-
alism. Without interpretation, theories simply would not have the kinds of features
which the realist takes as justications for the realist attitude.
Finally, there is a close relationship between equivalence and interpretation (a rela-
tionship which will be of much concern to us in this paper). The heart of the notion
of theoretical equivalence is a certain sort of ecumenicism with regards to equivalent
theories: if theories A and B are equivalent, then there is no question about which
of them one ought to commit oneself to, since advocating the one induces the same
commitments as advocating the other. This is why determinations of equivalence are
interesting and important, since they will tell us when we do or don’t need to make
choices amongst theories. But it also makes clear that interpretation and equivalence
are closely associated notions: for a pair of uninterpreted theories, there is no sense
to be made of the question of whether or not they are equivalent, since (as discussed
above) they do not have unambiguous rosters of commitments.
3 Against external interpretation
So, what kind of process or project could interpretation be, which brings about such
results? Iwish now to briey outline one approach to interpretationwhich iswidespread,
but—I contend—awed. I have in mind the “external” approach mentioned above,
which takes the interpretation of a theory to be analogous to the interpretation of a
passagewritten in a foreign language. In such cases, interpretation is amatter of trans-
lating the foreign passage into some antecedently understood tongue. By analogy,
then, these approaches to interpretation take some xed language as “transparent”—
as having its meaning already xed—and conceive of the task of interpreting a theory
as being that of translating it into the transparent idiom.
One famous example of this kind of project are attempts to reduce scientic (and
ordinary) discourse to some privileged “phenomenological” language. As a starting-
point, consider Russell’s project in Our Knowledge of the External World [Russell, 1993].
Russell is motivated by epistemic considerations, in particular a concern to ward o
skeptical doubt:
We are thus led to a distinction between what we may call “hard” data
and “soft” data. [. . . ] I mean by “hard” data those which resist the solvent
inuence of critical reection, and by “soft” data those which, under the
operation of this process, become to our minds more or less doubtful. The
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hardest of hard data are of two sorts: the particular facts of sense, and the
general truths of logic.7
If it is only the immediate objects of sensory experience and the truths of logic that
enjoy primitive epistemic privilege, then (claims Russell) the only way for science to
enjoy that same privilege is if the objects of science are, in fact, logical constructs from
the objects of sense: “it may be laid down quite generally that in so far as physics or
common sense is veriable, it must be capable of interpretation in terms of actual
sense-data alone.”8
We need not be concerned with this (rather dubious) epistemic motivation for the
project. Rather, we should be interested in the project itself: specically, Russell’s char-
acterisation of it as providing an interpretation in terms of sense-data. So although the
reductionist process has in mind an epistemic goal, the goal is to be accomplished by
semantic means, by providing a certain sort of account of what the theory is about. In
Russell’s hands, it doesn’t seem to be a requirement on the coherence or intelligibility of
a theory that it be cashed out into the currency of experience—merely a requirement
on its knowability. But it would not take long for the means and ends of such reduc-
tionism to be brought together. After reading Our Knowledge of the External World in
1921, Carnap was inspired to undertake his own version of the reductionist project,
culminating in 1928’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt [Carnap, 1967].
As with Russell, the overall project is to show how all the objects of science may
be constructed from the “autopsychological” basis of rst-personal experience. This
basis is comprised of “erlebs”, primitive and elementary such experiences, standing
in relations of recollected similarity; from these austere ingredients, we are to con-
struct rst theworld of physical objects, then the “heteropsychological”world of third-
personalmental congurations, andnally theworld of sociocultural institutions. Un-
like Russell, however, the coremotivation for such a construction is not (or at least, not
only) that of showing how our knowledge of the constructed world derives from our
knowledge of the constructive basis. There is now a further notion that this will show
how the meaning of discourse concerning the constructed world is cooked up out of
the meaningfulness of terms regarding the basis. As Carnap put it in an unpublished
lecture,
Quite generally, everything that we talk about must be reducible to what
I have experienced. Everything that I can know refers either to my own
7[Russell, 1993, pp. 77–78]
8[Russell, 1993, pp. 88–89]
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feelings, representations, thoughts and so forth, or it is to be inferred from
my perceptions. Each meaningful assertion, whether it concerns remote
objects or complicated scientic concepts, must be translatable into a state-
ment that speaks about contents of my own experience and, indeed, at
most about my perceptions.9
So what we have here is a particular story about where meaning comes from, in-
forming and underpinning a particular way of imbuing theories with content. Ac-
cording to this story, meaning ows in the rst instance from experience; and so, the
ultimate topic of all meaningful (interpreted) discourse must be sensory experience
itself. So we see an intimate relationship between the positivist or empiricist account
of meaning, and the associated conception of what is involved in interpreting a the-
ory. Note that the broader positivist program (of which Carnap’s work was a part)
exemplies the connections we canvassed in section 2 above between interpretation,
commitment, and equivalence. A theory’s true commitments are, it is suggested, ex-
hausted by the claims it makes about what is observable (identied, in the positivist
program, with the claims statable in the observation-language).10 And what it is for
two theories to be equivalent is just for them to have the same observational conse-
quences: empirical equivalence is a sucient condition for theoretical equivalence.11
Actually carrying out a project such as Carnap’s, however, turns out to be fraught
with diculties. The main problem is that scientic discourse does not, in general,
associate to each concept it employs a distinctive or canonical class of observable “in-
dicators”, or “criteria”, or “verication-conditions”; and even in the (rather articial)
caseswhere such indicators are to be had, theremay be further barriers to uniquely as-
sociating indicators with purely phenomenological data. For example, radioactive de-
caymay, under appropriate circumstances, be associated with the clicking of a Geiger
counter: but it is not always so associated (not even in all experimental contexts where
radiation is successfully detected), and it is hard to spell out “the clicking of a Geiger
counter” in terms of pure autopsychology. At the same time, the popularity of the
epistemic or semantic theses motivating these projects has severely waned. Claims
that we only “really” have knowledge of that with which we are immediately ac-
quainted, or that we only “really” understand claims about the immediate contents of
9[Carnap, 1929, p. 12]; quoted and translated in [Coa, 1991, p. 227].
10Hence the signicance of Craig’s theorem, insofar as it was taken to show that one could nd a
recursively axiomatisable theory capturing just the “observational content” of any other theory (see
[Craig, 1953], or [Putnam, 1965] for critical discussion).
11See e.g. [Reichenbach, 1938], or [Putnam, 1983] for a critique.
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experience, are (for whatever reason) nowhere near as widespread as they once were.
But this is not to say that interpretation by translation died with the positivists. In-
terpreting a theory by reducing it to a phenomenological basismay no longer be popular,
but (I claim) there is still a widespread idea that interpretation is, in the rst instance,
a matter of cashing the theory out in some privileged basis.12 For instance, consider
the primitive-ontology approach to quantum mechanics. Advocates of this approach
often stress the problems with explicating a theory’s (empirical) content in terms of
its phenomenological implications.13 Nevertheless, there is an important continuity.
Maudlin’s account of the relationship between the two approaches is exemplary, and
worth quoting at length:
There was a reasonable concern behind all this foolery [i.e., the project
of reducing physics to phenomenalist terms]. In order to be of interest,
physical theories have to make contact with some sort of evidence, some
grounds for taking them seriously or dismissing them. And the acquisi-
tion of evidence by humans clearly does involve experience at some point.
So it is not surprising that one might focus one how physical claims relate
to experience in an attempt to get a handle on the problem of evidence. But
for all that, it turns out to be the wrong handle to grasp since the connec-
tion between physical descriptions and experience has never been made
precise enough to admit analysis.
Rather, in classical physics the evidential connection is made between the
physical description and a certain class of local beables, such as the posi-
tions of macroscopic objects. [. . . ] Our ability to reliably observe such facts
[i.e., facts about the local beables] is not itself derived from the physics:
it is rather a presupposition used in testing the physics. So the contact
between theory and evidence is made exactly at the point of some local be-
ables: beables that are predictable according to the theory and intuitively
observable as well.
12It may be worth noting that the Aufbau is more pluralist about the choice of basis than one might
expect. In particular, Carnap explicitly allows that one could use a physical basis (such as (§62)
that consisting of elementary material particles or spacetime points), rather than a psychological
one, and notes that such a system“would have the advantage that it uses as its basic domain the
only domain (namely, the physical) which is characterized by a clear regularity of its processes.”
[Carnap, 1967, §59]
13Dialectically, this is because such explications are often associated with Copenhagen-style interpre-
tations of quantum theory, of the kind which primitive ontology seeks to oppose.
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The pre-theoretical intuition that certain physical states of aairs are un-
problematically observable is not couched in the terminology of a physical
theory: it is couched in everyday language. If Galileo drops rocks o the
Leaning Tower, what is important is that we accept that it is observable
when the rocks hit the ground. If the physical theory itself asserts that rocks
are made up of atoms, then it will follow according to the theory together
with intuition that we can observe when certain collections of atoms hit the
ground, but this latter is clearly not the content of the observation. If the
theory says instead that rocks are composed of elds, then it will follow
that we can observe when certain elds hit the ground, or when the eld
values near the ground become high. It is easy enough to see how to trans-
late the claim that we can see the rocks into the proprietary language of
atomic physics or continuum mechanics or string theory. But the critical
point is that the principles of translation are extremely easy and straightforward
when the connection is made via the local beables of the theory. Collections of
atoms or regions of strong eld or regions of high mass density, because
they are local beables, can unproblematically be rock-shaped and move in
reasonably precise trajectories. If the theory says that this is what rocks
really are, then we know how to translate the observable phenomena into
the language of the theory, and so make contact with the theoretical pre-
dictions.14
Let’s count the steps here. First, there is the claim that the empirical content of
a theory is better identied with its implications for the behaviour of macroscopic
objects, rather than its implications for sense-experience. Then follows the observation
that we already have a language for talking about such objects: namely, English (or
French, or Chinese, or whatever). So to pick out the implications of the theory for such
objects is—perhaps inter alia—to put certain terms of the theory into correspondence
with certain terms in English (or whatever). This idea is well taken, andwewill return
to it in §5 below.
Second, however, there is the claim that this correspondence is most easily done
when the theory contains designated local beables. For, given the local beables, we
may give a straightforwardly mereological account of how to accomplish this corre-
spondence: if rocks, tables, etc., are composed of the local beables, then “rock” is just
translated as “rock-shaped collections of local beables”. But what this means is that
14[Maudlin, 2007b, p. 3158–3159]
8
the local-beables portion of the theory’s language acquires meaning by being trans-
lated into ordinary English, with the rest of the theory then acquiring meaning from
its implications for the behaviour of those beables—and hence, possessing meaning
only insofar as it has implications for those beables. Thus Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghí
write:
According to (pre-quantum-mechanical) scientic precedent, when new
mathematically abstract theoretical entities are introduced into a theory,
the physical signicance of these entities, their very meaning insofar as
physics is concerned, arises from their dynamical role, from the role they
play in (governing) the evolution of the more primitive—more familiar
and less abstract—entities or dynamical variables. For example, in classi-
cal electrodynamics themeaning of the electromagnetic eld derives solely
from the Lorentz force equation, i.e., from the eld’s role in governing the
evolution of the positions of charged particles, through the specication of
the forces, acting upon these particles, to which the eld gives rise; while
in general relativity a similar statement can be made for the gravitational
metric tensor. That this should be so is rather obvious: Why would these
abstractions be introduced in the rst place, if not for their relevance to
the behavior of something else, which somehow already has physical signif-
icance?15
The result of all this is that for theories without local beables, there is no interpreta-
tive project available. If a theory does not posit a “primitive ontology” of local beables,
then it is uninterpretable, since there is nothing to be translated into English. So the
primitive ontology plays a privileged role in investing the theory with content: “the
fundamental requisite of the [primitive ontology] is that it should make absolutely
precise what the theory is fundamentally about”;16 “ignoring [the primitive ontology
of particle positions in Bohmian mechanics], the theory becomes a theory about noth-
ing”;17 “in a particle theory, [. . . ] particle positions are what the theory is about. The
role of all other variables is to say how the positions change.”18 Thus, interpreting a
theory is a matter of identifying the primitive ontology of the theory (or providing it
15[Dürr et al., 1992, pp.848–849]
16[Ghirardi, 2016]
17[Dürr, 2008, p. 117]; the context makes it reasonably clear that the claim generalises to other forms of
primitive ontology.
18[Dürr and Teufel, 2009, p. 38]
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with one, if none is forthcoming); the “extremely easy and straightforward” mereo-
logical translation into ordinary language then gives meaning to the claims the theory
makes about the primitive ontology, and thence to the theory as a whole.
Again, we nd a close-knit web of connections between interpretation, commitment
and equivalence. For example, [Allori et al., 2008] “suggest that two theories be re-
garded as physically equivalent when they lead to the same history of the PO [primi-
tive ontology]”.19 And an interesting recent trend in the primitive-ontology literature
is towards treating other aspects of a theory besides the primitive ontology—such as
the wavefunction or the electromagnetic elds—as not fully part of the theory’s com-
mitments.20
So we’ve now seen two examples of the external approach to interpretation. Other
examples could be adduced: in particular, certain questions in the metaphysics of
science (e.g. are physical properties dispositions?) could plausibly be characterised as
bids to “translate” our theories of physics into metaphysicalese. But for now, we have
enough examples to make clear the overall character of the external approach—and
my concerns about it.
There are two problems in particular with an external approach to interpretation.
First, since this approach involves pretheoretically privileging some particular model
of description, it gives rise to naturalist concerns. Insisting that any acceptable the-
ory must be translatable into the transparent idiom requires imposing constraints
on science which have been derived entirely (or almost entirely) from a priori philo-
sophical reection. This concern becomes particularly acute when the demand for
transparency is used to direct or constrain the search for theories: for instance, when
primitive ontologists demand that any acceptable quantum theorymust take a certain
form.21 We should be extremely skeptical that the reections of philosophers will oer
a better mechanism for theory choice in science than the practice of science does.
Secondly, there is a concern about the prima facie coherence of the project. This
view treats meaning as a kind of special resource, imported into our theories by es-
tablishing appropriate pipelines to other, already meaningful theories. But the source
has to be somewhere. So at some point, the question will need to be addressed of
why the transparent theory comes with meaning pre-equipped, in contrast to other
theories. What is it about our starting-point that lets it be spangled in content; and
19[Allori et al., 2008, p. 365]—although as discussed in n. 31 below, they also seem open to applying
the converse direction.
20See e.g. [Miller, 2014], [Callender, 2014], [Esfeld, 2014], or [Bhogal and Perry, 2015].
21e.g. [Egg and Esfeld, 2014], [Esfeld et al., 2014]
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what is it about all other places that they can only be rendered contentual by being
hooked up to this primary source, rather than being made signicant directly and on
their own terms? In the end, after all, we hope for a theory which holds all there is
within its compass. Interpreting such a theory cannot draw upon resources external
to it, by denition; it must be the case that “the theory itself sets the framework for
its interpretation”, as Everett famously claimed for his interpretation of quantumme-
chanics.22 So if nothing else, there is a value to be had in looking for an alternative to
external interpretation, against the day when we are called upon to interpret such a
theory.
4 What are we interpreting?
Towards developing an alternative picture of theory-interpretation, we should rst of
all pause to spell out in more detail just what it is we take ourselves to be interpreting.
That is: what, for our purposes, is a theory? The standard take on this question holds
that we have two available choices. We can take a syntactic view of theories, according
towhich theories are comprised by sets of sentences, formed andmanipulated accord-
ing to some appropriate formal calculus. Or we can take a semantic view of theories,
according to which theories are comprised by sets of models. In this section, I sug-
gest that we need make no such choice: rather, we should take a theory to comprise
both syntactic and semantic elements. Considering the sentences in isolation from the
models, or the models in isolation from the sentences, will fail to capture everything
of interest.23
Let’s consider an example theory. And let’s take about the simplest example pos-
sible: the theory of a single Newtonian particle. First, we have a pair of dynamical
variables: one independent variable of time, t, and one dependent variable of position, x.
Each of these ranges over a real-valued space. Let us use X to denote the range of x,
and T to denote the range of t. We also introduce a real-valued parameter m to char-
acterise the particle’s mass. Finally, we introduce a function V : X → R, to represent
the potential at various points in space (which we identify with the possible locations








23In this, I follow [Halvorson, 2012], [Halvorson, 2013], and [Lutz, 2015].
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The sense in which this equation summarises the physics of such a particle is as fol-
lows: any physically possible history for the particle is represented by a solution of the
equation. A solution, here, is a function f : T → X such that at every t ∈ T , the above
equation is satised. For instance, in the case of a free particle (V = 0), all solutions
are those functions of the form
f(t) = at+ b (2)
for a, b ∈ R.
This theory, simple though it is, already illustrates the core features of theories that
will concern us in what follows. First, we introduce some kind of formal language: in
this case, the language is just that of ordinary dierential equations. Second, we stip-
ulate the kinds of mathematical structures that will be put to representational work,
and the way in which they can make sentences of the language true or false: in this
case, the constructs are real-valued functions of one real argument, which may satisfy
or fail to satisfy those dierential equations. Finally, some kind of conditions (in the
formal language) are specied, which those constructs may satisfy or fail to satisfy: in
this case, the dierential equation (1). This serves to pick out some of the constructs
as privileged, i.e. those which do indeed satisfy the specied conditions: in this case,
the solutions (2) of (1).
Thus, our toy theory could be described as a set of syntactic conditions, together with
an account of the structures to which those conditions apply, and of what it would be
for them to be satised. It is for this reason that I take both the syntactic and semantic
views to be a poor t for the actual character of theories, at least if those views are
taken at face value. I think it matters what semantic constructions which are taken to
be the subject of the syntactic conditions; I certainly don’t want to require that the the-
ory’s content be speciable in terms of some kind of purely syntactic proof-procedure.
Equally, it matters that the models of the theory are not an arbitrary set of mathemat-
ical structures, but rather a set of structures answering to some specic set of con-
ditions. Moreover, I am quite happy with the idea that these models are “yoked to a
particular syntax”:24 the spaces T andX are explicitly labelled (by the variables t and x
respectively), in order to makemanifest how to assess whether the condition (1) holds
of a given function. (Although we will return to the issue of language-independence
in §5 below.) All this said, I don’t wish to rule out the notion that some more subtle
conception of the syntactic or semantic view is consistent with this way of thinking
about theories—indeed, I expect that one could render it consistent with a suciently
24[van Fraassen, 1989, p. 366]
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thoughtful version of either view.25 I merely wish to signal that it does not, so far as I
can see, coincide with thoughtless versions of either.
The theory above was formulated in terms of dierential equations, the workhorses
ofmodern physics. One traditional dicultywith relating the philosophical literature
to the practice of science is the former’s focus on theories formulated in terms of the
rst-order predicate calculus, despite the paucity of such theories in scientic prac-
tice. At least within physics, one is far more likely to come across laws in the form
of dierential equations, governing how systems evolve over time (or how elds may
be distributed over spacetime).26 However, the dierences between rst-order theo-
ries, and theories stated in terms of dierential equations, should not be overstated.
In fact, there are a series of useful and illuminating analogies between the two for-
malisms, which can guide us in how concepts from the one can be usefully applied to
the other—and which indicate that an account of interpretation should be applicable
to theories in either form.
To see this comparison, recall that a “theory” in rst-order model theory is typically
taken to be a set of sentences of a specied rst-order language. Such a language may
be identied with the set of well-formed formulae generated from a particular signa-
ture (set of relation- and function-symbols) Σ, according to the recursive syntax rules
of the predicate calculus. That sounds a lot like the syntactic conception of theories.
But model theory, of course, is not interested in such sets of sentences in isolation.
Say that a Σ-theory is a set of sentences of signature Σ. Then a Σ-structure S is a set
S, equipped with “interpretations” of the elements of Σ (maps from relation-symbols
to relations over S, and from function-symbols to functions over S). S may make Σ-
sentences true or false via the standard Tarskian clauses. If a Σ-structureMmakes all
the sentences of a Σ-theory T true, thenM is said to be a model of T; the class of all
models ofT is denotedMod(T). Somodel theory, as the name suggests, is interested in
analysing the various relationships between sets of sentences and their models.27 Hence,
a theory in the sense ofmodel theory exhibits the same tripartite structure that we saw
a moment ago. There is a specication of the kinds of mathematical structures that
will be used for representation (i.e. Σ-structures). There is a collection of syntacti-
cally given conditions (i.e. T). There is a subclass of the representational structures,
25Some (highly defeasible) evidence for this claim: when describing this view, I have been told both
that it is clearly best thought of as an appropriately careful version of the semantic view, and (by
others) that it is clearly best thought of as an appropriately careful version of the syntactic view.
26cf. [Maudlin, 2007a].
27I intend this to include relationships that hold between sets of sentences in virtue of their models:
for instance, the relation of logical equivalence (i.e., of having the same models).
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privileged in virtue of fullling the stated conditions (i.e. Mod(T)).
Furthermore, we can even see analogies between the intrinsic workings of the repre-
sentational structures in either case: we can think of a model of a rst-order theory as
describing the distribution of certain properties and relations over a set of individuals,
and we can think of a model of the Newtonian theory as describing the distribution
of a monadic determinable property (position) over some set of individuals (particle-
stages).28 I take this to be prima facie evidence that the form I describe for theories in
general (a set of syntactic conditions governing some mathematical structures of an
appropriate type) is indeed an appropriately generic form for theories to take. Hence,
I will suppose that this kind of form is an appropriate target for our account of inter-
pretation. I now turn to giving that account.
5 Internal interpretation
Aswe have now seen, part of what it is to give a theory is to provide a semantics for it:
i.e., some class of mathematical structures which systematically bestow truth-values
upon the sentences of the theory’s language. However, we need not treat that seman-
tics as immediately codifying all of a theory’s commitments; the semantics provided
as part of an (uninterpreted) theory is merely a putative semantics, whose role is to
characterise the background logic. To interpret a theory is to indicate what parts, or
components, or aspects of the putative semantics are to be taken seriously. How is
that to be done, other than putting into correspondence with some already-serious
theory?
Towards an answer, let’s return to one of the issues that came up when discussing
external interpretation. We saw there that one of the characteristic features of these
interpretations was that they tended to induce a criterion of equivalence: for two the-
ories (say) to be equivalent was just for them to correspond to the same theory in the
external language. [Coey, 2014] has argued that this demonstrates, more generally,
that there is no interesting independent question of when two theories are equivalent:
For those of us who think sense can be made of a theory’s physical con-
tent beyond what the theory says about the empirically conrmable or
28This exploiting the fact that T can equally well be thought of as representing time, or as repre-
senting the instantaneous stages of a particle (along the lines of the “stage theory” defended by
[Sider, 1996]); it seems more natural to take such stages, rather than instants of time, to be the sub-
ject of predication here.
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disconrmable—in short, for those of us who take the interpretive project
seriously in the philosophy of physics—there’s a natural and seemingly
simple account of theoretical equivalence that can easily accommodate the
preceding puzzles:
Two theoretical formulations are theoretically equivalent exactly
if they say the same thing about what the physical world is like,
where that content goes well beyond their observable or empiri-
cal claims. Theoretical equivalence is a function of interpretation.
It’s a relation between completely interpreted formulations.
Insofar as we can understand the physical pictures provided by dierent
interpreted formalisms, and insofar as we’re capable of comparing those
pictures, we can straightforwardly determine whether two interpreted for-
mulations are theoretically equivalent, whether they say the same thing
about what the physical world is like.29
As discussed in §2 above, I am inclined to think that “taking the interpretive project
seriously” is not just the province of realists, but that is not my main concern here.
Rather, it is that this conclusion only follows if one understands the interpretive project
along the lines of the external account: i.e., as Coey says, as the project of articulat-
ing the “physical pictures” associated with a pair of formalisms. Now that we’ve seen
some of the problems in how such picturing could take place,30 Coey’s account sug-
gests a natural place to get o the boat: reverse the order of dependence between
commitment and equivalence. When interpreting by translation, one articulates the
theory’s commitments in the privileged language, and uses that as a means of deter-
mining equivalence. As Coey notes, and aswe saw above, two theories ormodels are
equivalent just in case they say the same things in the privileged language. On the al-
ternative conception—which we shall call the internal approach to interpretation—we
begin by making determinations of equivalence (between models within one theory,
or between the models of one theory and those of another), and use those determina-
tions to get a x on the theory’s commitments. We do this by employing the following
29[Coey, 2014, pp. 834–835]
30To be fair, Coey acknowledges that there are diculties in unpacking the notion of external inter-
pretation: his claim is merely that “if we are already committed to the coherence of the interpretive
project in foundational physics, [. . . ] then we are already presupposing the necessary semantic
knowledge. On this approach to theoretical equivalence, we incur no new semantic debts not al-
ready incurred in virtue of our commitment to the interpretive project itself.” [Coey, 2014, p. 835].
But this does not hold if, as I suggest here, judgments of equivalence are what undergird the inter-
pretive project.
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principle, the converse of Coey’s: the theory is committed to whatever is invariant
across equivalences, i.e., to all and only that which is shared by equivalent models.31
Thus, on the internal view, interpreting a theory is a matter of postulating certain
equivalences between elements of the putative semantics. In eect, we abstract away
from the dierences between the (declared-to-be) equivalent models. The results of
this process of abstraction—that is, the things we obtain by abstracting from the mod-
els in this way—are naturally understood as possible worlds: “possible”, that is, in
the sense of being nomologically possible relative to taking the claims of the theory
as laws. This expresses the fact that we generally explicate theory-relative possibility
by looking to what sorts of things are true in some model or other of the theory. Is
it possible, according to General Relativity that black holes exist? Yes, because there
are models of the theory according to which black holes exist. Is it possible, according
to quantum mechanics, for a particle to spontaneously accelerate? No, because there
is no model of the theory in which that is the case. But we do not straightforwardly
associate models with possibilities, in a one-to-one fashion. Dieomorphic models
of General Relativity are standardly taken to represent the same possibility, as are
a corresponding pair of wave-mechanical and matrix-mechanical models of quantum
mechanics. Sowe should not identify the possibleworldswith themodels themselves,
but rather with the results of abstracting from the models by the equivalence relation
postulated in interpreting the theory. This suggestion provides the standard link be-
tween interpretation and modality: in an interpreted theory, equivalent models are
those which represent the same possible world. In contrast to the standard account,
however, our grasp of the possible worlds follows (or rather, is provided by) our pos-
tulation of the equivalence-relations between models.32
For instance, at least if we are using standard mathematical tools,33 models can be
distinctwhilst still being isomorphic: perhaps onemodel has a domain comprising the
31It should be noted that [Allori et al., 2008] are sympathetic to such an idea. The quotation given in
§3 above continues, “Conversely, one could dene the notion of PO [primitive ontology] in terms
of physical equivalence: The PO is described by those variables that remain invariant under all
physical equivalences.” [Allori et al., 2008, p. 365]
32Despite its naturalness (especially, the way it meshes with the way working scientists tend to talk
of possibility), this view of possible worlds has not been very popular amongst metaphysicians.
Indeed, I am not sure that it has been explicitly defended. Its closest relative, so far as I am aware,
is the view Lewis describes as “pictorial ersatzism” [Lewis, 1986, §3.3], although even that is only
a partial match. (Which may be for the best, given that pictorial ersatzism seems to generally be
reckoned implausible: e.g. “[Pictorial ersatzism is] an odd, hybrid view that, I suspect, no one has
or ever will hold” [Bricker, 2006, p. 42]; “pictorial ersatzism is a puzzling view, and may have no
actual adherents” [Nolan, 2015, p. 64].)
33Rather than, say, homotopy type theory (see [The Univalent Foundations Program, 2013]).
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natural numbers as its domain, whereas its isomorphic cousin has the integers. But
perhaps we should be sceptical that this distinction corresponds to any dierence,
if we want to deny that the particular identities of the objects used to populate the
models are playing any substantive representational role.34 If so, we should interpret
isomorphic models as equivalent, and deny that the dierences between them are to
be taken seriously.35
Or, more generally, one might maintain that if a theory contains symmetries (or at
least, symmetries of a certain kind), then the theory should be interpreted as commit-
ted only to those components of its ontology which are invariant under those sym-
metries.36 Again, the internal approach cashes out this lesson as a matter of asserting
equivalence between symmetry-related models of the theory. Two such models rep-
resent the same possibility; but this is as much a clarication of what we mean by
“possibility” as anything else.
Turning to relationships between theories (rather than within theories): as we have
noted above, models (at least as I am understanding them) are language-soaked enti-
ties: they wear their syntactic labels on their sleeves, as it were. (If we want to be more
formal about this, we can observe that the relevant notion of isomorphism for models
of a theory is one which preserves those labels: an isomorphism from a modelM to
another model N is a bijection f : |M| → |N | such that (say) the extension FM is
mapped to FN ,RM is mapped toRN , etc.) But we don’t think that these labels should
be taken seriously. So we interpret the theory in such a way that they are not—which
is just to say that we regard two theories as equivalent if they agree up to a choice of




And this criterion of equivalence gets cashed out in the observation that a modelA of
the former theory should be regarded as equivalent to a model B of the latter theory
if they are related by such a swapping of labels: if, that is, the two models are related
34cf. [Kaplan, 1975].
35As e.g. [Pooley, 2006] and [Weatherall, MS] advocate as a solution to the Hole Argument.
36There is a large literature on the merits or demerits of this as an interpretative stance: see e.g.







More generally, we might take the view that if two theories are related by a sys-
tematic translation, then they are equivalent. This could be made precise in terms of
denitional or translational equivalence.37 More generally still, we could allow that
even if the two theories disagree on how many things there are, they are still equiv-
alent if the extra objects in one are all appropriately “constructible” from the objects
of the other, and vice versa. This could be made precise in terms of so-called “Morita
equivalence”.38 In either case, a notable feature of these accounts of equivalence is that
if two theories can be shown to be equivalent (in either sense), there is a corresponding
equivalence between the classes of models of the two theories.
Now, this is not to say that all of the above interpretative moves can be defended.
For example, fans of grounding or fundamentality may want to resist the idea that
translationally equivalent theories should be regarded as equivalent: which terms are
primitive and which are dened, they could insist, encodes diering commitments
about which properties are fundamental and which are derivative.39 A larger audi-
ence will want to resist the idea that Morita-equivalent theories are equivalent: that
opens theway, for instance, formereological nihilism anduniversalism to collapse into
one another. My point here is not to defend this or that specic interpretative move,
but just to observe that each such move can be characterised as the presentation and
advocacy of some criterion of equivalence or other.
Thus far, I have concentrated on how an internal interpretation aects our under-
standing of the relationships between the semantic structures of the theories (i.e., their
classes of models). However, doing so also has profound implications for our under-
standing of the relationships amongst and between the syntactic structures (i.e., the
sentences). Suppose that we are dealing with a single theory, and we decide to in-
terpret the theory in such a way that some non-isomorphic models of the theory are
equivalent. In general, this will mean that some of the sentences (in the theory’s lan-
37See [Glymour, 1970], [Barrett and Halvorson, 2015a].
38See [Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b].
39See e.g. [Maudlin, 2007b]’s claim that one can have two versions of electromagnetism: one in which
charge density is primitive, and correlated by the laws with the divergence of the electric eld; and
one in which charge density is dened as the divergence ofE. [Hicks and Schaer, 2015] also discuss
the relationship between denability and non-fundamentality.
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guage) which are true of one model are not true of the other.40 Suppose, then, that σ
is such a sentence. Then by interpreting the theory in this fashion, we commit our-
selves to thinking that σ is somehow defective, since its truth-value varies between
equivalent models. Or, more precisely, it shows that σ contains some element of con-
ventionality. In practical terms, this means that if two parties disagree over σ, that
need not mean that there is anything genuinely at issue. For instance, suppose that
we interpret electromagnetism in such a way that models related by a gauge sym-
metry are equivalent (as is standard scientic practice). We are then committed to
thinking that gauge-dependent sentences are defective in this fashion: if you and I
disagree over a sentence such as “the electrical potential is everywhere vanishing”,
that does not show that we disagree in any substantive fashion. In order to crystallise
a disagreement, we would have had to agree on a gauge convention. Then, and only
then, would our disagreement over gauge-variant sentences be worth arguing over.
Thus, interpreting a theory can mean identifying certain portions of the theoretical
language as privileged: namely, those elements of it which are appropriately invari-
ant under the equivalence-relations that have been identied. This leads to a certain
commonality with the external approach. For example, one could be a primitive ontol-
ogist on the internal approach: the criterion for equivalence would be that the models
agree on what the chosen local beables of the theory are up to. It would follow from
this that statements about the behaviour of those theoretical entities other than the lo-
cal beables are problematic in the sameway that statements about the electromagnetic
potential are. So it risks sounding like we are back at the same overall picture that I
described (and criticised) in §3: a privileged subset of the theoretical vocabulary de-
scribes the true commitments of the theory, so that models are equivalent just in case
their reducts to that vocabulary agree.
This impression can become even stronger if we think about how theories make
contact with evidence. Earlier, I made approving noises about the idea that the em-
pirical content of a theory should be sought in the picture—if any—which the theory
provides of the motions of macroscopic bodies in space. Moreover, we might worry
that it just seems true that—as a matter of scientic practice—these stipulations are
what it is to interpret a theory. Sure, a critic might contend, there is some role for
the sort of semantic clarication discussed above; but it’s surely obvious that such
40It is not guaranteed, of course. In rst-order theories, models may be non-isomorphic yet elemen-
tarily equivalent (i.e., such as to make all the same sentences true); and in theories formulated in
terms of dierential geometry, two models might be locally identical (thereby satisfying precisely
the same local dierential equations), whilst diering in their global topological character.
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an interpretative task will only constitute part of what interpreting a theory involves.
The assimilation of the theoretical vocabulary of a scientic theory to the quotidian
vocabulary of day-to-day usage, and the corresponding connection of the theoretical
architecture to our overall picture of theworld, plays an enormously signicant role in
endowing the theory with semantic content. Can these observations be incorporated
into the internal account, without having it collapse into the external account?
Let us consider the second issue rst. What role does specifying the “meaning”
of certain variables play, according to internal interpretation? Simply this: they are
prescriptions for what identities (if any) should be postulated in the event that two
theories are conjoined. For example, if we have specied that the term ρ in one theory
represents “charge density” (say), and that the term µ in another theory does the same,
then that serves to commit ourselves to adding a condition µ = ρ in the event we
conjoin the two theories. An important special case of this is when we seek to conjoin
some theory with what might be called our empirical theory, which summarises our
empirical or experimental data.41 To use an example we have seen before, we might
specify that the pointlike variables in one theory represent “atoms”, and furthermore
that rocks are made up of atoms. This commits us to thinking that the trajectories of
rocks should coincide with the trajectories of collectives of the pointlike variables: in
other words, that the motions of rocks will be predicted by the theory.42
Hence, the claimswhich the external approach describes as “specications ofmean-
ing” are understood as away of getting a larger and richer theory, rather than as a form
of interpretation per se. This is the major dierence between the internal and external
approaches to interpretation. As a result, there is a big dierence in how claims such
as “x represents the position of the particle” bear upon the interpretation of the the-
ory, and (correlatively) the kind of authority they are taken to enjoy. For the advocate
of external interpretation, these claims possess a particular kind of semantic author-
ity: they are denitions, and so bind the term to express a certain kind of thing (i.e., to
express the same thing as its translation in the antecedently meaningful transparent
language). On the internal approach, however, these claims dier only in degree from
assertions such as (1), not in kind.
It follows that according to the internal approach, such claims are not compulsory
41cf. Nagel’s notion of an “experimental law” [Nagel, 1979, chap. 5]
42So, a theory being falsied is better described as our larger theory (the conjunction of the particular
theory with the empirical theory, together with appropriate bridging claims) turning out to be in-
consistent. This conception of truth in terms of consistency was defended by the early Reichenbach:
see [Reichenbach, 1965, chap. IV].
20
for the business of interpretation. Sure, one way of xing the relationships amongst
the models of the theory (or between a pair of theories) is to translate that theory (or
both theories) into a common tongue, whose interpretation is asserted to be literal—
that is, to be such that dierent models always represent dierent possibilities. But
there is no compulsion to do so—nor will it always be the case that all equivalence-
relations can be represented in terms of sharing a common vocabulary. For instance,
it is not clear how to make sense of this idea for translating between two theories in
dierent languages. Even within a single theory, it will not always be the case that the
invariant fragment of the theory’s language itself constitutes a well-formed language:
in general, it need not have the recursive structure of sentences generated by a com-
positional syntax. (Specically: there are, in general, complex invariant statements
which cannot be generated by assembly from simpler invariant statements; they can
only be generated by assembly from simple variant statements.)43 And even when the
equivalence-relations do correspond to a common tongue in this way, there is cer-
tainly no requirement that the common tongue must take a particular form (e.g. that
it must speak in purely phenomenological terms, or that it must talk only of local be-
ables). This is important if we desire an account of interpretation which respects the
naturalistic constraints canvassed at the end of §3.
On the internal picture, then, we always wind up with a theory, of one sort or an-
other; there is no way of stepping outside all networks of representation altogether,
and standing cheek by jowl to the world. Or, turning it around, we do stand cheek
by jowl with the world when we represent it, in one form or another, and we should
not defer the task of representation to an impossible standard whereby scientic rep-
resentation is somehow not good enough. In other words, what the external ap-
proach thought of as the life and soul of interpretation—the fusion of one theory with
another—turns out to be merely a prelude to interpretation proper. Hence, a full un-
derstanding of how such external explication operates must, perforce, depend on a
full understanding of the mechanics of internal explication.
6 Conclusion
I will conclude by considering a nal issue, which may have been perturbing the
reader. If it really is the case that the internal approach to interpretation puts the
43It is for this reason that it is highly non-trivial to “reduce” a theory with symmetries to a theory that
tracs only in quantities invariant under the symmetry.
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postulation of equivalences prior to the possible worlds, then what kinds of consider-
ations are to be deployed in advocating one interpretation over another? That is, what
makes something a good interpretation or not? If the possible worlds are somehow
“there” prior to and independently of the process of interpretation, and if the models
of the theory are just in the business of representing those worlds, then we could give
a straightforward criterion for whether an interpretation is good or not: it’s good just
in case it judges two models to be equivalent exactly when they represent the same
possible world. But if the possible worlds are (in some sense) constructions from an
interpretation, then it looks as though all interpretations will be on a par. If I have
an interpretation you dislike, then you cannot charge me with being mistaken about
what the possible worlds are like. By denition,my possible worlds (i.e., those appro-
priate to the modality associated to my interpretation of the theory) are in line with
my interpretation; just as your possible worlds are in line with your interpretation. So
what can you say to persuade me out of my interpretation?
The answer is that you can say exactly the sorts of things you would normally say
in criticising someone’s interpretation—just without the detour via metaphysically
robust possible worlds. For example, suppose that you think my interpretation is too
ne-grained: it takes some models as inequivalent (i.e., to represent distinct possi-
bilities), which you think should be taken as equivalent. Suppose further that you
think this for essentially epistemic reasons: onmy interpretation there are certain facts
(those concerning which of the allegedly distinct possibilities is actual) that would be
in principle inaccessible to knowers in those possibilities. That’s still a good argument
against my interpretation! For, as discussed in the previous section, what interpre-
tation one plumps for aects what sentences will have determinate truth-values (in
worlds governed by the theory), and hence what kinds of arguments one thinks are
worth having about the theory. If you’re right in your epistemic argument, then I’m
committed to there being certain kinds of arguments that are worth having, but which
cannot (even in principle) be settled by appeal to empirical evidence. That’s a prob-
lem, though not an insurmountable one. Perhaps the kinds of explanation that can
be given in my interpretation are better, or perhaps the ontology associated with it is
somehow better (e.g. it abides by a principal of local action). Whatever the details, the
point for our purposes is just that this kind of familiar back-and-forth is not, so far as
I can tell, improved by holding that we are arguing about the nature of antecedently
existing possible worlds. Indeed, doing so would seem to merely add to the mys-
tery. Why think that these worlds are never epistemically distinguishable? Or that
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their ontologies are especially intelligible? It’s reasonably easy to think of pragmatic
virtues for interpretations which are epistemically or explanatorily well-behaved, or
which involve more readily intelligible ontologies. But that suggests that some more
deationary account of possible worlds ts betterwithmaking sense of disagreements
over the best interpretation. It opens up the space for pragmatic virtues to be decisive
in anointing one interpretation as “best”, without being crowded out by the simple
virtue of being right or wrong.
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